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COMA1VENTS
RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAW OF PICKETING
In view* of the recent statement made by Assistant Attorney General,
Thurman Arnold, that labor unions are still included within the purview
of the Sherman Anti-trust Act and the announcement made by Mayor
La Guardia that in New York City "cross-picketing" by labor unions en-
gaged in jurisdictional disputes will not be tolerated, it is now particularly
timely to attempt an analysis of some of the recent trends in the age-old
struggle between industry' and labor2 as seen both by legislative action and
court decisions. This struggle appears to be passing through yet another
transitional stage.3 The earliest battles between these two seemingly inimical
groups were the direct outgrowth of the factory system and the resulting neces-
sity for the workers to band themselves together into labor unions: It was in-
evitable that the employers, believing that a threat to themselves was inherent
in the rise of labor unions, should seek by legal means to crush them.5 Never-
theless, the power of labor grew steadily, albeit slowly, until recently the legal
pendulum appeared to be swinging to a much pronounced pro-labor position.0
In recent months, the swing of the pendulum seems to have reached its peal:
and appears to be receding. This is evidenced both by legislative enactment
1. In this comment, the word "industry" means any single branch of productive activity;
the labor and capital employed in a trade or department of busine:s. Fu z., m WA;,.t,
NEw STAz_,;n DiCrIoARY (1930) 1255.
2. When the word "labor" is used in this paper it refers to those pzople who work
in the industries. It is the intention of the writers that the term "labor" sbhall not be
construed as meaning the laboring class as a whole.
For one phase of the struggle between industry and labor, see Christ, The Federal Arti-
Injunction Bill (1932) 26 IxT. L. Rrv. 516.
3. Nelles and Mlermin, Holmes and Labor Law (1936) N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 517; Green,
The Legal Aspects of the Labor Movement (1935) 15 0rM L. R-v. 13, 162 25.
4. Green, supra note 3, at 15: "Progressive strength and militancy of combinations of
laborers have developed concurrently with our budness and corporate developments and
with the centralization of wealth. That is, mass production meant mass employmnt;
mass employment brought combinations of workers in like proportion, uxcept ,here in-
dustry by force and coercion denied the right of organization. The development of industry
-that is, the combinations of capital and centralization of wealth-brought an ever incrwas-
ing inequality of bargaining power between the individual worker and owners of industry.
Conditions now ezisting leave no freedom to contract by the individual laborer. All of
the courts to the contrary, there can be no 'freedom of contract, where no freedem to
contract exists!" See EskIn, The Legality of "Peaceful Coercion" in Labor Disputes (1937)
35 U. or PA. L. Rnv. 456.
5. Witte, Early American Labor Cases (1926) 35 YALu L. J. 825; Nelles, Cor',won-
wealth v. Huns (1932) 32 CoL. L. R v. 1128, 1166; Eskin, supra note 4.
6. 47 STAT. 70-73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (Supp. 1933); 49 STr. 449-457
(1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-166 (Supp. 1938); 52 STAT. 1060-1059, 29 U. S. C. A.
§§ 201-219 (Supp. 1938); Idaho Laws 1933, c. 215; Lm'D. STAT. Amz. (Burns, 1933)
§§ 40-301 to 40-514; La. Laws 1937, Act No. 203, p. 600; N. Y. Ci,. Pruc. Acr (1935)
§ 876-A; Ozr. Conz Azw. (1930) §§ 49-901 to 49-905; Wis. Laws 1935, §§ 103.53-103.63.
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and by court decisions. 7 Never was this tendency more apparent than in the
treatment which the courts and legislatures have accorded to picketing. Whether
the present legal trend will ultimately result in a better understanding between
labor and industry or whether the courts will once again be forced to deprive
labor of the benefits of organization only time will tell.
Labor Organization As A Conspiracy
The right to picket has long been regarded by labor as one of its most
potent weapons.8 This weapon, together with the strike and the boycott, 10
might well be classified as the "three musketeers of labor." In the past, the
right to picket has been restrained so consistently by the courts that one of
the sources of labor's antipathy towards the courts is traced to that fact."1
The doctrine of conspiracy was utilized in the earliest attempts to limit the
activities of the laboring groups.12 The tendency during the last half of the
19th century was to discourage collective action. The theory of laissez-fairc
7. Mich. 1939, Session Bill No. 109; Minn. Laws 1939, c. 440; Pa. Laws 1939, Act No.
163; Ore. Laws 1939, c. 2; Wis. Laws 1939, c. 25.
Wiest v. Dirks, 20 N. E. (2d) 969 (Ind. 1939); State v. Cooper, 285 N. W. 903 (Minn.
1939); May's Furs and Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 255 App. Div. 643, 8 N. Y. S. (2d)
819 (2d Dep't 1939); Buch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 168 Misc.
224, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 970, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 819
(2d Dep't 1939); People v. Rosensweig, 171 Misc. 702, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 795 (Mag. Ct.
1939); Stalban v. Friedman, 171 Misc. 106, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 343 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Jewish
Memorial Hospital v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (2d Dep't 1937);
Remington Rand Inc. v. Crofoot, 248 App. Div. 356, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1025 (4th Dep't
1936); Forneli v. Auto Mechanics' Union, 5 Lab. Rel. Rep. 61 (Wash. 1939).
8. HARPEa, TORTS (1935) 490; see dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Vegebahn
v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N. E. 1077, 1079 (1896); Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissent-
ing in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 354 (1921). See also Comment (1932) 46 HAv.
L. REV. 125, 126.
9. See HARPER, TORTS (1935) 487.
10. "As to the legality of boycotts, the decisions are again in great conflict. The so-
called 'primary' boycott is, of course, perfectly lawful. This is the withdrawal of patronage
from one party to the industrial dispute by the other party and an attempt to persuade
third persons to do the same. The greatest conflict of view arises in cases in which one
party resorts to the 'secondary' boycott, by bringing economic pressure to bear upon third
parties to induce such persons to join in the boycott against the other party to the dispute.
By the more convincing and socially desirable view, such boycotts are lawful. 'If It be
true,' said Mr. Justice Holmes, in a Massachusetts case 'that workingmen may combine,
with a view, among other things, to getting as much as they can for their labor, just as
capital may combine with a view to getting the greatest possible return, it must be true
that, when combined, they have the same liberty that combined capital has to support
their interest by argument, persuasion, and the bestowing or refusal of those advantages
which they otherwise lawfully control.'" HARPER, TORTS (1935) 491.
11. Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 YAix L. J. 682, 682; Witte, supra note 5,
at 835; Green, supra note 3, at 25.
12. FRAN.FURTER AND GREEN, THE LABon INJuNcrION (1930) 3, note 10.
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controlled the social outlook of the period.1 3 After the appearances of the labor
cases, the law of conspiracy was broadened, and the mere conspiring together
became the gist of the action.' 4 The law of conspiracy, being shrouded in
vagueness, was admirably adapted for the prosecution of labor combinations
because it made it possible for the judges to enforce their own innate preju-
dices.' 5 Despite the English cases to the effect that mere combination to do
non-criminal acts cannot constitute the crime of the conspiracy,'0 the courts
in this country extended the idea of criminal conspiracy to include trade com-
binations which were actually engaged in asserting their lawful demands for
higher wages, shorter hours or better working conditions.' 7  In the famous
Cordwainers' case,' 8 the defendants were found guilty of conspiracy on the
ground that the mere combination to raise their wages, although lawful when
done by an individual, became illegal by joint action. It was not until the
famous case of Comvwnwealth v. Hunt'" that a leading jurisdiction recognized
the inherent weakness of this position and held the defendants innocent of
criminal conspiracy. This case applied for the first time the tests which later
13. Nelles and Mermin, supra note 3, at 533.
14. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy (1922) 35 HTAv. L. REv. 393, 399, 403; FniwrunTrr
mzo GRaEa, op. cit. supra note 12, at 3.
15. "The truth of the matter is that the judges found the Hawkins conception of
criminal conspiracy entirely too convenient an instrument for enforcing their own indi-
vidual notions of justice to be lightly discarded. It enabled judges to punish by criminal
process such concerted conduct as seemed to them socially oppreive or undesirable even
though the actual deeds committed constituted of themselves no crime, Either by statute
or by common law." Sayre, supra note 14, at 406.
16. "In fact, during the whole of the seventeenth century, when the courts were stretch-
ing and liberalzing legal principles and doctrines to extremely wide limits, there Eee=m
to be no evidence of a single case (apart from the doubtful exception of Starling's Case),
where the courts allowed a conspiracy conviction for a combination to commit an act
not itself criminal.' Sayre, supra note 14, at 401.
17. Nelles, supra note 5. People v. Melvin, 2 Wheeler Crim. Rep. 429 (N. Y. 1886);
People v. Kostka, 4 Crim. Rep. 429 (N. Y. 1886); Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927,
6 S. E. 620 (1888); State v. Dyer, 67 Vt. 814, 32 Ad. 690 (1895). See State v. Stewart,
59 Vt. 273, 9 At. 559, 568 (1887) wherein the court said that "the principle upon which
the cases, English and American, proceed, is that every man has-the right to employ his
talents, industry and capital as he pleases, free from the dictation of others; and, if two
or more persons combine to coerce his choice in this behalf, it is a criminal conspiracy."
Branson v. Industrial Workers of the World, 30 Nev. 270, 95 Pac. 354 (190); State v.
Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 151 (1867). See Parker Paint & Wall Paper Co. v. Local Union
No. 813, 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S. E. 911 (1921). Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council of
Portland and Vicinity, 99 Ore. 1, 192 Pac. 765 (1920).
18. This, it is believed, was the first trial in America of wage-earners as such for trade
union conspiracy. The report of the case was printed as a pamphlet in 1806. It may
be found reprinted in 3 Comrox-s & Gnroar, Doctrus_.arNmy HLsronv or Arnsc.ur
Ix.-usraLm SocirTr, 59-284. See Nelles, The First American Labor Case (1931) 41 Y,L
L. J. 165.
19. 4 Metc. 111 (Mass. 1842). For an extended discussion of this case see Nelles, supra
note S.
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were to be used in the labor injunction cases, namely, is the purpose justifiable"0
and are the means employed lawful?2 ' Ever since the case was decided, the
doctrine of conspiracy has been gradually abandoned as a means of checking
the labor movement. 22
The Right to Picket
Picketing is generally understood to mean the patrolling of the area in
front of or adjacent to the premises of an employer for the avowed purposes of
making public the existence of a labor dispute and thereby securing the support
of the employer's prospective customers.2 3 The manifold ramifications which
this right may develop are to be found in the cases of almost everyone of the
forty-eight state jurisdictions and of the federal courts.
The right to picket had been denied in some jurisdictions as illegal per se.
This was accomplished either by statutes24 or judicial decisions.2 5 The gist
of the decisions which regarded picketing as unlawful in itself held that it
could never be peaceful and without some element of intimidation and coer-
cion.26 As was stated in a leading case upon this subject: "But the public's
rights are invaded the moment the means employed are such as are calculated
to, and naturally do, incite to crowds, riots, and disturbances of the peace. A
20. See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111, 129 (Mass. 1842).
21. Id. at 134.
22. FRAxxyuRTER AND -GREEK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 4; Witte, supra note 5.
23. Mills v. U. S. Printing Co. of Ohio, 99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. Supp. 185 (2d
Dep't, 1904). See People v. Kopezak, 153 Misc. 187, 189, 274 N. Y. Supp. 629, 631 (Sp.
Sess. 1934) wherein the court defines picketing: "To be placed on watch or guard, to
watch at or about factories to persuade workers to refrain from accepting employment
during a strike or otherwise to influence or observe them, to act as a picket in a strike,
a committee placed on guard or patrol to intercept non-union workers and persuade or
-otherwise urge them against taking a particular job, especially during a strike." See HAIRa,
ToRTs (1935) 490.
24. ALA. CODE AIN. (Michie, 1928) § 3448; NaB. Comy. STAT. (1929) § 28-812 to § 28-
814. UTAH RFvV. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 49-2-3 to 49-2-7.
25. Santa Fe Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1905); A. R. Barnes & Co.
v. Chicago Typographical Union, 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 940 (1908); Ellis v. Journeyman's
Barbers I. U. of America, 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111 (1922); Beck v. Railway Team-
sters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898); Clarage v. Luphringer, 202
Mich. 612, 168 N. W. 440 (1918).
26. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the name 'picket' indicated a
militant purpose, inconsistent with peaceable persuasion." American Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 205 (1921). See Franklin Union, No. 4
v. People, 220 IlI. 355, 77 N. E. 176 (1906); A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical
Union No. 16, 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 940 (1908); Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective
Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898); Santa Fe Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (C. C.
S. D. Iowa 1905).
A New Jersey court stated: "Obviously, the line of demarcation between peaceful picket-
ing, if there is any such thing, and that which is threatening, intimidating or coercive,
is so finely drawn as to be almost imperceptible." Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers'
Club, 99 N. J. Eq. 770, 780, 134 AtI. 309, 313 (1926).
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picket, (sic) in its very nature, tends to accomplish, and is designed to accom-
plish these very things. It tends to, and is designed by physical intimidation
to, deter other men from seeking employment in the places vacated by the
strikers. ... We think it plain that the very end to be attained by picketing,
however artful may be the means to accomplish that end, is the injury to the
boycotted business through physical molestation and physical fear, caused to
the employer, to those whom he may have employed, or who may seek employ-
ment from him, and to the general public." 27
The pressure of public opinion compelled the courts gradually to adopt -5 the
view that picketing was permissable where the purpose was justifiable and the
means employed by the pickets are not tortious.2 9 Nevertheless, thereafter,
many courts still held that the purpose of strikers was illegal and the means
tortious and therefore the employer was entitled to the equitable relief of an
injunction restraining all picketing.o The abuses of the equitable injunction
in such cases were the basis of labor's continuous agitation for legislative re-
lief.' The basis of equitable intervention is supposedly the irreparable damage
caused by the actions of the defendant to the property of the plaintiff. But a
27. Pierce v. Stablemen's Union Local No. 8, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324, 328 (199).
23. Sarros v. Nouris, 15 Del. Ch. 391, 138 Atl. 607 (1927); Scofes v. Helmar, 205 Ind.
596, 187 N. E. 662 (1933); Exchange Baking & Restaurant Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260,
157 N. E. 130 (1927). Fi B:n'RTER Ai'm Gxr..,; Tim Lmmon Iiy..crno!. (1930) 23.
"Self-interest, in its undefined amplitude, is the end that justifies. But of the innumerable
ways in which self-interest may be asserted, only those grant immunity which have ta
direct relation to benefits that the laborers are trying to obtain? Obviously this is a tes;t
implying judgment on economic and social data; yet it is treated as 'a question of law to
be decided by the court.' Applying it the Massachusetts Supreme Court recognizes a,
legal a strike for higher wages, shorter hours and improved shop conditions; here the
self-interest is patent, or rather patently immediate."
Holmes, Prh&0ege, Malice, and lident (1894) 8 HARv. L. Rsv. 1, 3 "the intentional
infliction of temporal damage, or the doing of an act manifestly likely to inflict Euch
damage and inflicting it, is actionable if done without just cause. When the defendant
escapes, the court is of opinion that he has acted with just cause."
29. McMichael v. Atlantic Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, 103 S. E. 226 (1921); Inter-
national Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove, 158 .Md. 496, 148 AtL 826 (1930); Iverson
v. Dilno, 44 Mont. 270, 119 Pac. 719 (1911); La France Electrical Construction and
Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 3, 103 Ohio 61,
140 N. E. 899 (1923); Citizens' Co. v. Asheville Typographical Union, No. 263, 187 N. C.
42, 121 S. E. 31 (1924); Kirmse v. Adler, 311 Pa. 78, 166 At. 566 (1933); International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Local Union No. 123 v. Dorothy Frocks Co., 95 S. W. (2d)
1346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
30. American Steel Foundries v. Ti-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921);
Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union No. 218, 110 Fed. 698 (C. C. N. D. Ohio, 1910); Knudsen
v. Benn, 123 Fed. 636 (C. C. D. Minn., 1903); Levy and Devaney v. International Pochet-
book Workers' Union, 114 Conn. 319, 153 Atl. 795 (1932); Beck v. Railway Teamster'
Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898).
31. FAer u An GRm, THE LAoR INylucrioN (1930) 134-150; Rorva=, L wL9.l
LAw (1939) 68.
32. Witte, supra note 5, at 836.
19401
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study of the gradual development of the law regarding picketing in labor con-
flicts shows clearly that the equitable power was being misused to enforce the
innate economic prejudices of the judges33 Much of the antagonism of labor
towards the courts is predicated upon the inherent defects in the procedure
relevent to the issuance of the labor injunctions. It must be remembered that
the problems engendered by the ordinary labor controversy are far more eco-
nomic than legal. The delay incident as a result of the issuance of an ex partc
order restraining picketing is frequently fatal to the cause of the workers.
Moreover the courts were prone to issue restraining orders and temporary in-
junctions upon the presentation of mere affidavits in support of the petitioner's
claims. These affidavits often were stereotyped and lacking in substantive
weight, but they served the immediate purpose of disrupting the morale of the
workers. The injunctions which were granted by the courts frequently em-
bodied sweeping verbiage which made it incomprehensible to the ordinary man
and made it a dragnet within which even peaceful activities, hitherto un-
questioned by the particular courts, might be punishable as violative of the
injunction.3 4
Labor and the Anti-Trust Acts
Although, as its name indicates, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act"0 was originally
passed primarily to curb the evil of trusts and massed combinations of capital,
it was soon used by the district courts as a weapon against combinations of
laboring groups.3 6 This expansion ultimately received the Supreme Court's
sanction in the famous Danbury Hatters' case.37 Its most definite exposition
33. Warm, A Study of the Judicial Attitude Toward Trade Unions and Labor Legislation
(1939) 23 MnNN. L. Rav. 255, 266; FRz=, "T E LABoR INJUNco (1922). Forl criticisms
of Frey's book see Sayre, Book Review (1923) 71 U. or PA. L. Rav. 411; Chaffee, Book
Review (1923) 36 IMRv. L. REV. 503.
34. Sayre, supra note 11, at 682: "There can be no question but that in the issue of
labor injunctions many courts have abused their powers. Not only have sweeping injunc-
tions couched in all-inclusive terms been improvidently granted, only to be vacated by
higher courts after they have served the complainant's purposes, but the injunction method
itself as applied to labor controversies is open to serious question. For in the field of labor
disputes where two groups, acting collectively are pitted against each other in a sharp
struggle for supremacy, the situation often reminds one of the German advance upon Paris
in 1914. Time is of the essence. Delay is defeat. A strike organization falls to pieces
through mere delay and inaction. In such a case the issue of a temporary injunction
or restraining order commonly results, not, as in ordinary cases, in maintaining the status
quo and thus preventing irreparable injury until a more thorough examination of the issue
can be made, but in virtually awarding victory in advance by tying the hands of the
defendants during the critical moments of the struggle."
35. 26 STAT. 209-210 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1934).
36. United States v. Workingmen's Council of New Orleans, 54 Fed. 994 (C. C. E. D.
La. 1893), af'd, 57 Fed. 85 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893); Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 Fcd. 149
(W. D. Ga., 1893); United States v. Elliott, 62 Fed. 801 (E. D. Mo. 1894); Thomas v.
Cincinnati, N. 0. P. Ry., 62 Fed. 803 (S. D. Ohio 1894).
37. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908).
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was made in the Gompers case: 38
"It [the Sherman Anti-Trust Act] covered any illegal means by which
interstate commerce is restrained, whether by unlawful combinations of capital
or unlawful combinations of labor; and we think also whether the restraint be
occasioned by unlawful contracts, trusts, pooling arrangements, blacklists, boy-
cotts, coercion, threats, intimidation, and whether these be made effective, in
whole or in part, by acts, words or printed matter." 30
The labor unions were also restrained on the ground that they constituted
an interference with the free movement of public carriers. 0 As a result, in
1914 the Clayton Act 4' was passed to remedy the disastrous effect of the appli-
cation of the anti-trust laws to labor combinations. The act provided that
nothing in the Sherman Act should apply to labor unions.P But there is
nothing in the new law which prohibited the federal courts from enjoining ac-
tivities of labor unions which were in the restraint of trade. 3 The use of such
38. Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911).
39. Id. at 438.
40. An early reason for giving injunctive relief to railroads was to protect them in
the discharge of their duty towards the public. The railroads were mostly in the hands
of receivers and any interference with their operations was punished as contempt of court.
Nelles, A Strike and its Legal Consequences (1931) 40 Y=ns L. J. 507; Witte, supra note 5;
FrANamzTE ,N, GRima, THE LASoR Iyiu crioz (1930) 1S, 19; United States v. Deb3,
64 Fed. 724 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1894). See Stephens v. Ohio State Telephone Co., 240 Fed.
759 (N. D. Ohio 1917) where the telephone subscribers were permitted to sue for an in-
junction to restrain strike activities against the telephone company. The popular outcry
against so-called government injunction as a result of the Debs case occupled the attention
of the public. The press took up the cry and the political campaign of 1896 vas waged
to a large extent about this issue. 2 WAREN, Tnm Su mRm Comm ni U.,n= a ST,=S
ItsToRY (Rev. ed. 1932) 702-705; Frankfurter and Green, Legislation Affecting Labor
Injzctions (1929) 38 YArx L. J. 879.
41. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 17 (1934).
42. 38 Smra. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 17 (1934) reads; "The labor of a human being
is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall
be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock
or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations,
or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws."
43. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922); Na-
tional Association of Window Glass Manufacturers v. United States, 263 U. S. 403 (1923).
In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 469 (1921) the court in speaking of
Section 6 of the Clayton Act states: "This section assumes the normal objects of a labor or-
ganization to be legitimate, and declares that nothing in the anti-trust laws shall be construed
to forbid the existence and operation of such organizations or to forid their members from
lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects; and that such an organization shall not
be held in itself-merely because of its existence and operation-to be an illegal combina-
tion or conspiracy in restraint of trade. But there is nothing in the section to exempt
such an organization or its members from accountability where it or they depart from
1940]
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terms as "lawful" and "lawfully", "peaceful" and "peacefully" were held by
the United States Supreme Court to "rebut a legislative intent to confer a
general immunity for conduct violative of the anti-trust laws, or otherwise
unlawful." 44
The Clayton Act was designed to regulate the issuance of injunctions in
labor disputes. The Act was judicially emasculated by restricting its applica-
tion to parties in the immediate relationship of employer and employee.4" It
could thus be rendered inapplicable by the simple device of filling the former
employees' places and thereby destroying the requisite privity.40 The applica-
bility of the Act was also limited to those industrial controversies in which
the workers' demands were for immediate benefits such as higher wages, shorter
hours or better working conditions. 47
Norris-Ia Guardia Act
The Norris-La Guardia Act 48 was passed in 1932 to remedy the abuses in-
herent in the labor injunction. Section 104 of the Act limits the power of the
courts of the United States to issue injunctions. By its terms no injunction
may issue to restrain the "giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts
involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or
by any other method not involving fraud or violence." 49 The Act also estab-
lishes the conditions under which injunctions may issue. It is necessary for
the courts to make certain findings of facts, after hearing testimony in open
court; sufficient notice must be accorded to the defendant of the application
for the injunction. Finally, the injunction must set forth specifically the par-
ticular acts enjoined.50 The court's power to issue injunctions under the terms
of the Act was further curtailed by a liberal definition of what is a labor dis-
pute.5 1 However the courts in different judicial districts continued to inter-
pret "labor dispute" in different ways. 2
its normal and legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade." Accord: Coronado Coal Company v. United Mine Workers of America,
268 U. S. 295 (1925).
44. See Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 473 (1921).
45. Duplex Printing Company v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921); American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921); Sayre, supra note
11, at 689; FRANKFURER AND GRamx, T E LABOR INJUNcTION (1930) 165; RoTIwmN,
LABOR LAw (1939) 71.
46. Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland Inc., 263 Fed. 171 (W. D. Ohio 1919).
47. Bedford Cut Stone v. Journeymen, 274 U. S. 37 (1927); Alco-Zander Co. v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 35 F. (2d) 203 (E. D. Pa. 1929).
48. 47 STAT. 70-72 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (1934).
49. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 104(e) (1938).
50. 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 107 (1938).
51. 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 113 (1938). Among other things the term
"labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment,
or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintain-
ing, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment regardlesM of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
52. In Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 21 F.
[Vol. 9
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The question of what constitutes a labor dispute within the meaning of
this act has been presented to the courts in a number of cases. Picketing of
an employer whose own employees were not members of any union, by outside
pickets wishing to unionize the plant is not considered a labor dispute in one
district decision.5 3 This court disregarded the express wording of the statute
and held that the Norris-La Guardia Act merely eliminated the former require-
ment of employer-employee relationship but was inapplicable when there was
no labor dispute as a fact. This case has not as yet gone to the United States
Supreme Court, but there seems little doubt that the court as presently con-
stituted would reverse the decision, especially in view of the New Negro AM-
aice case.P4
The federal circuit courts are also divided as to whether picketing by a labor
union to induce the employer to oust an opposing union constitutes a "labor
dispute" within the meaning of the Act.55 It would seem that there is included
in the definition of "labor dispute" all peaceful picketing for the purpose of
unionization, whether or not there is an immediate controversy between the
Supp. 807 (W. D. Mo. 1937) the court granted a temporary injunction restraining the
defendant from attempting to unionize the plaintiff's plant without regard to the pro-
visions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act because no labor dispute was involved there.
This result was reached by holding that "refusal to accede to any unauthorized demand
can in no sense be termed a 'dispute'2' In Donnelly Garment Co. v. International L.
G. W. Union, 20 F. Supp. 767, 769 (W. D. Mo. 1937) the court described § 113 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 113 (1938) as "a mass of confus-
ing verbiage," and found no labor dispute in an attempt to unionize a factory. In M. & M.
Wood Working Co. v. Plywood and Veneer Workers Local, 23 F. Supp. 11, 20 (D. C.
Ore. 1938) the court arrived at a just and sound result in a jurisdictional labor dispute,
but did not feel bound to follow the procedure of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, holding,
"It must be shown that if there is any labor dispute that the plaintiff has some interest
in the dispute. Furthermore, it must be a 'labor dispute', not a dispute between laborer-."
In United Electric Coal Companies v. Rice, SO F. (2d) 1, 5 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) the
court held: "Equally clear we think must be the conclusion that the dispute referred to
in the statute mzst be one between employer and employee or growing out of their re-
lationshlp. It does not apply to disputes between employees or to disputes between
employee unions to which employer is not a real party."
Contra: Lauf v. E. G. Shenner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary
Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (1938). Coryell & Son v. Petroleum Workers Union, 19 F. Supp.
749 (D. C. Mlinn. 1936); Cupples Co. v. A. F. of L., 20 F. Supp. 894 (E. D. Mo. 1937).
53. Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 21 F.
Supp. 807 (W. D. Mo. 1937).
54. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (1938). In this care
an association of negroes organized for the mutual improvement of its members requezted
the Sanitary Grocery Company to adopt a policy of employing Negro clerks. The re-
quest was ignored, whereupon the organization caused pickets to be placed in front ot
the stores. The Supreme Court held that within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia
act there was a "labor dispute" in which the Negro organization and its officers were
personally interested.
55. See note 54, supra.
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employer and employee, and regardless of the fact that the employees of the
establishment do not belong to the union which is picketingP0
State Statutes
Many of the state legislatures, using the Norris-La Guardia Act as a guide,
have passed similar statutes. 7 These statutes all contain the same broad defi-
nition of a "labor dispute".58 The state courts have usually adopted a broader
view of the rights of labor under their anti-injunction statutes than many federal
district courts. Nowhere is this trend more noticeable than in the interpretation
of what is a labor dispute. The absence of a dispute between the employer
and his employees has been disregarded by most of the courts so long as the
unions were engaged in picketing for a lawful purpose. Picketing for the pur-
56. 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 113 (Supp. 1938). This section specifically
states what will constitute a labor dispute.
57. Idaho Laws 1933, c. 215; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 40-501; La. Laws
1934 Act No. 203; Md. Laws 1935 art. 100, c. 574 §§ 65-72; MiNN. STAT. (Mason, Supp.
1936) § 4256 et. seq.; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac'r (1935) § 876a; N. D. Laws 1935 c. 247;
OR. CoD ANN. (Supp. 1935) § 49-1901 et seq.; UTAH Rav. STAT. ANN. (1933) §§ 496
to 492-8; WASH. Rrv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, Supp. 1939) §§ 7612 et. seq.; Wis. STAT.
(1935) §§ 103.53-103.63; Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, Supp. 1934) §§ 63-201 to
63-207. New Mexico last year passed an act which reverted to the Clayton Act by the
N. M. Laws 1939, c. 495, § 2.
58. (A) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the
case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft or occupation;
or have direct or indirect interests therein: or who are employees of the same employer:
or who are members of the same or of and affiliated organization of employers or em-
ployees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or association of
employers and one or more employees or association of employees. (2) between one or
more employers or association of employers and one or more employers or association of
employers; or (3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one
or more employees or association of employees; or when the case involves any conflicting
or competing interests in a "labor dispute" of persons participating or "interested"
therein.
(B) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested
in a labor dispute if relief is soughf against him or it, and if he or it is engaged in the
same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs or has a direct
or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent of any association composed
in whole or part of employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or
occupation.
(C) The term "labor dispute includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee". N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247 § 12. The following states have almost identical
definitions of a "labor dispute" in their statutes: ORE. COnE ANN. (Supp. 1935) § 49-1913;
Wis. STAT. (1935) § 103.62; WASH. Rrv. STAT. ANN. (Remington Supp., 1939) § 7612;
Mnrw. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936) § 4260-12; La. Laws 1934, Act 203 § 12; IND. STAT. ANN.
(Burns, 1933) § 40-513; Idaho Sess. Laws 1933, c. 25 § 12.
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pose of bringing about a "closed shop" or for the purpose of inducing an
employer to supplant a union with which he contracted has in most instances
been regarded as a labor dispute within the broad meaning of the statutory
definition.P9 These anti-injunction statutes coupled their broad definition of
a "labor dispute" with provisions that a temporary injunction could not be
granted except after a hearing and after findings of all the facts by the court,
required by the statute in question. The statutes provided that the findings
must determine that unlawful acts were about to be committed or continued
unless restrained; that the public officers charged with the duty to protect the
complainant's property had failed or were unable to furnish adequate protec-
tion. If the court ascertained these facts, it could grant a temporary injunction
which by its own terms would expire within ten days. A permanent injunction
could not be granted until after the trial of the issues. When an injunction
was issued it could not contain provisions restraining any person from ceasing
to perform any work or remaining in any relation of employment; becoming
or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any employer organ-
ization regardless of any agreement, undertaking or promise. The injunction
could not prohibit giving publicity to the existence of any labor dispute whether
by advertising, speaking, picketing, or by any other method not involving
fraud, violence or breach of the peace. 0 This anti-injunction legislation should
have effected a real advance over all prior legislation. The courts should have
felt constrained to approach these questions with a determination to translate
into action the public policy behind such legislation. In addition, the complete
renovation of the procedure in obtaining labor injunctions should have resulted
in the removal of most of the abuses previously inherent in this practise.
The objective is accomplished under the current New York statute0 ' by a strict
compliance with the procedure outlined in the act. By so doing the courts are
merely introducing established equitable principles in the place of peculiarly
inequitable practices which had developed by means of the labor injunction.
Following the passage of anti-injunction legislation by most of our states,
and the passage of the Wagner Act012 labor organizations, particularly the
C.I.O., were quick to take advantage of the removal of their former legal dis-
abilities. Instead of a sound, healthy growth, trade unions sprung into power
overnight in industries which had formerly been non-union. This mushroom
growth of labor organizations was so rapid that organized labor was in the
59. Scafes v. Helmar, 205 Ind. 566, 187 N. E. 662 (1933) ; Dehan v. Hotel and Retaurant
Employees and Beverage Dispensers, Local Union No. 183, 159 So. 637 (La. App. 1935);
Stillwell Theatre Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932); Goldfinger v. Feintuch,
276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937); O'Keefe v. Laeul, 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d)
77 (1938); Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n., 155 Ore. 652, 63 P. (2d) 109D (1936);
Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397 (1936). Contra:
Elking v. Retail Clerks' Protective Assn., 114 N. J. Eq. 5S6, 169 At. 494 (1933); Safe
Way Stores Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union, 184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d) 372 (1935).
60. See statutes note 58, supra.
61. N. Y. Cmv. PRAC. AcT (1935) § 876-A.
62. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-168 (Supp. 1938).
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position of an army that had outrun its lines of communication and had lost
contact with its sources of supply. This led to a sharp division in the ranks
of labor itself. The adoption of the sitdown strike6 as a labor weapon, and
a broader definition of jurisdictional disputes followed. Thus 'the C.I.O. was
able to use economic pressure in the form of picketing to force itself upon an em-
ploying unit which was not anti-union but in fact had an existing contract with
the A. F. of L.0 4 Then followed the demand that the owner of a business should
be barred from performing any labor himself, 0 6-all these developments result-
ing in another swing in the pendulum of public opinion adverse to labor.
The Pendulum Swings
The State of Pennsylvania in a recent statute 0 has again adopted the re-
pressive ex parte injunction in cases where a majority of the employees have
not joined a labor organization, or where two or more labor organizations are
competing for membership of the employees, or where any labor organization
engages in a course of conduct intended or calculated to coerce an employer
to compel his employees to become members of a particular labor organization; 07
but it does not deprive labor of their other rights for which labor had so long
striven.""
A clearer indication of the back swing of public opinion is found in the State
of Oregon where the changes in the labor law were proposed by initiative
petition and approved by a substantial majority at a regular general election."
This statute was passed seemingly as a result of the disregard of the public
rights by labor organizations.7" As evidenced by former statutes,71 this state
63. See Warm, supra note 34, af 272.
64. Comment (1939) 6 U. or Cm. L. REv. 673 treats of the "Globe Rule" for deter-
mining appropriate bargain unions under the Wagner Act.
65. Senn. v. Tile Layers' Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
66. Pa. Laws 1939, Gen. Assembly, Act No. 163.
67. Id. § 4b provides inter alia that the injunction restrictions of the anti-injunction act
shall not apply "where a majority of the employees have not joined a labor organization,
or where two or more labor organizations are competing for membership of the em-
ployees, and any labor organization or any of its officers, agents, representatives, employees
or members are engaged in a course of conduct intended or calculated to coerce an em-
ployer to compel or require his employees to prefer or become members of or otherwise
join any labor organization."
68. For a view that this 1939 Act was more equitable to all groups in the community
and more consisfent see Dusen, The Progress of Labor Law (1939) 14 Tmp. L. Q. 11.
69. Ore. Laws 1939, c. 2. This act was proposed by initiative petition and was approved
by vote of 197,771 to 148,460 at the regular general election, Nov. 8, 1938. By proclama-
tion of the Governor, dated Dec. 1, 1938, the act was declared to have been approved
and to be in full force and effect.
70. The struggle between Beck and Harry Bridges for the control of labor, particularly
the question of jurisdiction over Maritime workers, and the abuses connected with Beck's
control of the Teamsters Union, was well known to the Oregon voters.
71. ORE. CODE. Amr. (Supp. 1935) §§ 49-1901 to 49-1914. See supra note 70. For a
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was one of the most liberal and progressive until the adoption of the present
statute. The Oregon statute has deprived labor of the benefits of the anti-
injunction statute by defining a labor dispute to include only an actual bona
fide controversy in which the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer
and the majority of his employees and in which matters directly pertaining
to wages, hours, or working condition of the employees of the particular em-
ployer are involved.72 This definition eliminates from the protection of the
law all strikes called for organization purposes; or a strike called by a craft
union for increased wages or better working conditions if the craft union has
only a minority of all the employees even though it has a majority in its own
craft. The statute specifically states that a controversy between two different
unions as to which one is to be the bargaining agent is not to be clased as
a labor dispute73 and the refusal of the employer to deal with either party
in such a jurisdictional controversy does not make such action a labor dispute.
The statute further provides that the circuit courts of the states have juris-
diction and full power to issue restraining orders, temporary and permanent
injunctions.74
From the reading of the statute there seems to be no doubt that an employer
similar restriction on labor see Wis. Laws 1939, c. 25, which defines "labor dispute" as
"any controversy between any employer and the majority of his employees in a collective
bargaining unit2'
72. Ore. Laws 1939, c. 2 § 1. WiTsconsin by recent legislation achieves the same result
by its definition of a labor dispute. See supra note 71. Pennsylvania sp-cifically excludes
from the protection of the anti-injunction statutes labor disputes in which two or more
labor organizations are competing for membership of the employees. See supra note 6S.
73. Ibid.
74. This provision is specifically set forth in the Oregon statute (Ore. Laws 1939, c.
2 § 6). Under the new Wisconsin labor statute (Wis. Laws 1939, c. 25) it is unlawful
for anyone to engage in picketing except where there is a labor dispute which as defined
by this act is a controversy between the employer and the majority of his emp!oyces.
It would seem that since the statute specifies certain types of picketing as unlawful,
such picketing can be enjoined in equity. Pennsylvania achieves the same result. See note
69, supra. In the new 1innesota Labor Relations Act (Ainn. Laws 1939, c. 440) the
main purpose is the prevention and settlement of strikes. However, it is to be noted
that it is specifically made unlawful for more than one person to picket a single entrance
to any place of employment when there is no strike in progress at the time. It is also
unlawful under the statute for an employee or labor organization to institute a. strike it
the calling of such strike is a violation of any valid collective agreement bctween an em-
ployer and his employees or labor organization, and the employer is, at the time, in
good faith, complying with the provisions of the agreement.
One must also take into consideration a recent Michigan Statute (Mich.x Reg. Sess. 1939
House Enrolled Act No. 184) which has a provision that it shall be unlawful for any
employee or other person by force, coercion, intimidation or threats to force or attempt
to force any person to become or remain a member of a labor organization, or for any
employee or person by force, coercion, intimidation, or threats to force or attempt to force
any person to refrain from engaging in employment. It would seem from past expri-
ence that the words "coercion" and "intimidation" would probably be seized upon by
judges in their opinions with disastrous effect to the cause of labor.
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can get an ex parte injunction. Thus the growth of organized labor is curtailed
by this definition of a labor dispute. The power of anyone to picket even the
plant of an employer unless there is a bona fide labor dispute as defined by
this act is prohibited. 75 This prohibition of a union representing a minority
of employees from picketing a plant deprives such a union for all practical
purposes of a right to strike even for higher wages and better conditions or
for recognition of the union as the collective bargaining agent for its own
members and no others. It would seem that this restriction upon picketing
would necessarily prevent craft unions from organizing their own craft. This
provision seems of doubtful constitutionality since it prevents either a labor
union or the individual workers from calling the public's attention to their
just claims and thereby curtails their freedom of speech, guaranteed by the
Federal constitution. 6
The activities of labor unions are further curtailed in Oregon by a provision
75. For similar provisions in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Minnesota see supra note 74.
76. "The Oregon Circuit Court for Multnomoh County (a 3-judge court) recently
upheld the validity of the so-called Antipicketing Act of 1939. . The ruling of the court
was based on the ground that the statute regulates but does not prohibit picketing and
boycotting. It was pointed out that picketing in furtherance of a strike called as a result
of a labor dispute between an employer and the majority of his employees, directly per-
taining to wages, hours, or working conditions of the employees involved in the contro-
versy is permitted. The court further overruled the contentions that the statute conflicted
with the National Labor Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and impaired the
freedom of speech, press, and assembly. (American Federation of Labor v. Bain)" (1939)
49 MONraLy LABOR Rav. 679). A sounder view would seem to be that reached by the
Colorado Supreme Court in holding that peaceful picketing could not be prohibited in
that state. The court declared that to prohibit peaceful picketing "would be contrary to
'the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions', and therefore would violate the due-process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution, since it would impair freedom of speech." People v.
Harris, 91 P. (2d) 989 (1939).
In Senn v. Tile Layers' Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937) at 481, Mr. Justice
Brandeis quotes with approval the language of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin which
compares picketing by a union to competition between merchants by means of advertising
in the press, by circulars and window displays, and holds that the union, as well as the
merchant, has the right to strive by legal means to win the patronage of the public. Senn.
v. Tile Layers' Protective Union, Local No. 5, 222 Wis. 383, 388, 268 N. W. 270, 273
(1936). It is submitted that this position is sound.
It has been held, and seems to be the law today, that freedom of speech and press
is "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Stromberg
v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931); Grosjean
v. American Press. Co. Inc., 297 U. S. 233 (1936); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S.
652 (1925); C. I. 0. v. Hague, 83 L. ed. 928 (1939); see Warren, The NewA "Liberty"
Under the Fourteenth Amendment (1926) 39 Harv. L .Rev. 431.
The view that peaceful picketing is a liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment Is not
in conflict with Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921). The statute in question in
that case was held to have legalized conduct which was not simply picketing or lawful
persuasion but constituted an admitted tort.
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that it is unlawful for any union to make any charge or exaction for initiation
fees, dues, fines or other exactions which will create a fund in excess of the
legitimate requirements of such organization in carrying out its lawful purposes
or activities 77 Since this section of the statute has not been interpreted by
the Oregon courts, it is impossible to state with certainty the meaning of the
expressions, "exactions", "legitimate requirements" or "lawful purpose" 8 But
it seems that these provisions may result in the prevention of labor unions from
acquiring sufficient funds to enable them to carry on a strike to a successful
conclusion or sufficient funds to enable a union to attempt to organize other
employee groups in the same industry. This possibility is indicated by a fur-
ther provision that all labor organizations should keep books open to inspec-
tion by any member thereof at "all reasonable times". This latter provision
alone handicaps a labor union when it is about to embark on a legitimate strike
as defined by the act, in that it is possible for an employer, through the use
of a spy, to know the exact financial condition of the union and exactly how
long it can continue to pay strike benefits and thus how long the strike can
be carried onY9 Thus an employer organization is in a better position to
combat unionism than it has ever been since the development of strong unions.
The Trend in the Courts
This trend has not only been set forth by legislative enactment, but has
been followed by judge made law. 0 New York, which has always been in
the lead in progressive court decisions, 8' has, in a recent decision, enjoined all
picketing in spite of the clear wording of the New York statute.82 The late
Justice Cotillo of the New York Supreme Court stated in the Busch Jcwclry
77. Ore. Laws 1939, c. 2 § 4.
78. Even the limited right of picketing that the statute allows to labor may further
he curtailed if the Oregon courts interpret the worlds "lawful purpose" in conformity
with the obvious purposes of this act.
79. The demands of the employers that unions be required to incorporate were
instigated to accomplish the same ends that this section of the Oregon statute has
accomplished.
So. May's Furs and Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 255 App. Div. 643, 8 N. Y. S. (2d)
819 (2d Dep't 1939); Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 163 Mizk.
224, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd 255 App. Div. 970, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 819
(2d Dep't 1939); People v. Rosensweig, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 795 (Mag. Ct. 1939); State
v. Cooper, 285 N. W. 903 (Minn. 1939) (peaceful picketing of employer's home in protest
of discharge of chauffeur held disorderly conduct); Forneli v. Auto Mechanics Union, 5
Lab. Rel. Rep. 61 (Wash. 1939) (temporary cessation of picketing held to have ter-
minated a "labor dispute" make subsequent picketing illegal); Wiest v. Dirks, 20 N. E.
(2d) 969 (Ind. 1939); Stalban v. Friedman, 171 Misc. 106, 11 N. Y. S. (2d)343 (Sup.
Ct. 1939); Jewish Memorial Hospital v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1111
(2d Dep't 1937); Remington Rand Inc. v. Crofoot, 243 App. Div. 356, 289 N. Y. Supp.
1025 (4th Dep't 1936).
81. Exchange Baking and Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130
(1921); Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 532 (1917).
82. N. Y. Cv. PRAc. AcT § 876-A.
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Co. case " that where a union has repeatedly and consistently engaged in
unlawful picketing accompanied by disorder, intimidation, loud and boisterous
language, false statements, congregating in great masses and where it appeared
that there was danger of continuance of such unlawful acts with consequential
injury, if picketing was permitted to continue, a court of equity will enjoin
all picketing. This opinion is based on the ground that Section 876-A of the
New York Civil Practice Act is merely procedural and that it does not with-
draw any substantive powers from the courts of equity.8 4 It seems strange
that a court of equity cannot cope with the admitted abuses of a particular
labor situation without depriving the employees of their rights as specifically
guaranteed by statute. It must be remembered, in this connection, that the
statute provides punishment for violating a labor injunction by contempt pro-
ceedings, 85 but only after a trial by jury.86
Is Labor Included in the Sherman Act Today?
The recent letter87 sent by Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney General, in
reply to an inquiry from the Secretary of the Central Labor Union of Indian-
apolis, stated that he felt that labor unions were not entirely exempt from
prosecution under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. He seemingly and with just
cause has taken a middle view between the rigors of the Duplex case 8 and
the view of the leaders of organized labor that labor unions are completely
exempt from prosecution under the Sherman Act. He states that his attack
is against unreasonable restraint upon industry designed to prevent the use of
cheaper material or more efficient methods, compulsion upon employers to
hire useless and unnecessary labor, unreasonable restraints designed to enforce
systems of graft and extortion, illegally fixed prices, and to destroy an estab-
lished and legitimate system of collective bargaining. 9 Mr. Arnold's view is
83. Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union , 168 Misc. 224, 5 N. Y. S.
(2d) 575 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 970, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 819 (2d Dep't 1939).
84. This point was raised but not passed upon in the case of Goldfinger v. Feinbuch,
276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937) which case upheld the constitutionality of N. Y.
Crv. PRAc. Acr § 876-A. However, there is nothing in this case to support justice Cotillo's
decision.
85. It is hard to conceive that a court has power to successfully punish by contempt
in a case where all picketing was enjoined (Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees'
Union, 169 Misc. 156, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 872 (Sup. Ct. 1938) and lacks powers to successfully
enforce an injunction which merely restrains unlawful picketing.
86. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 299, § 753 A Judiciary Law held constitutional in Kronowltz
v. Schlansky, 156 Misc. 717, 282 N. Y. Supp. 564 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Comment (1935) 21
IowA LAvW Ray. 595. Several states have similar statutes requiring a jury trial before
any person can be adjudged in contempt for violating an injunction issued in connection
with a labor dispute. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purden 1936) tit. p. 17 § 2047, held constitutional
in Pa. Anthracite Mining Co. v. Anthracite Miners Ass'n, 318 Pa. 401, 178 Atl. 291
(1935); ORB. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) § 49-1911; Wis. STAT. (1937) § 133.07.
87. New York Herald Tribune, Nov. 20, 1939, p. 2, c. 3.
88. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
89. See supra note 90.
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sound. It does not deprive a labor union of any rights, but holds a labor
union to be acting in restraint of trade only under such circumstances and
for such acts as any corporation or individual would be held responsible for
under the Act.9 °
Conclusion
The abuses and excesses in the labor movement as exemplified by the juris-
dictional disputes, sit-down strikes, mass picketing, violence and total disregard
of the public's rights should be curtailed by law and eliminated by the labor
organizations themselves. If this result could be accomplished from within
the labor movement by independent action, saner and more lasting results
could be obtained. Public opinion, so important in labor legislation, would not
be aroused against the labor unions. It must be remembered that public opinion
is important to a successful strike, since the economic pressure asserted by a
union can only be sustained while the public refuses to cross a picket line.
Until these abuses are eliminated from within, it is the duty of the legisla-
tures to eliminate them from without, but this duty should not, as has been
done in the statutes discussed,91 be used as a screen to curtail legitimate union
activities and as a means of fighting the growth of unionization. The public
policy of a state is served by the prevention or prompt settlement of labor
disputes. 2 Strikes, lockouts and other forms of industrial strife, regardless
of where the merits of the controversy lie, are forces productive ultimately of
economic waste. Experience has proved that this policy can best be effectuated
through protection by law of the right of the employees to organize and bargain
collectively 9 3 This policy is certainly not promoted by laws, such as recently
passed, which have as their object the curtailment of labor unions, as such;
and which, to accomplish their ends, would deprive labor even of the right of
free speech. 4
90. Mayor LaGuardia of New York City (co-author of the Norris-LaGuardia Act)
recently condemned indiscriminate picketing in jurisdictional disputes and stated he would
not tolerate cross-picketing anywhere in the city. This may seem an unreasonable and
unexpected restraint on the right to picket. The Mayor said he felt his view was thoroughly
consistent with the Norris-LaGuardia Act since no labor dispute was involved in uch
jurisdictional strife. New York Times, Dec. 8, 1939, p. 1, c. 3.
91. Mr. Arnold's views as expressed* in this letter seem to have been specifically ap-
proved by Frank Murphy, Attorney General, in his correspondence with William Green,
President of the A. F. of L. See N. Y. World Telegram, Dec. 6, 1939, p. 30, col. 1.
92. Ore. Laws 1939, c. 2; Wis. Laws 1939, c. 57; Mich., Reg. &--s. 1939, House
Enrolled Act No. 184; Minn. Sess. Laws 1939, c. 440.
93. It is to be noted that statutes passed to restrict trade unions often use similar
expressions for a statement of purpose. See preamble to Mich., Reg. Secs. 1939, House
Enrolled Act No. 184.
94. See Wagner Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. 1938).
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